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The Heileman Power: Well-Honed Tool
or Blunt Instrument?t
THOMAS A. TozER*
INTRODUCTION
Proponents of judicial case management' justify the reform of pretrial
procedures by pointing to a crisis in American courts: backlogged cases,
disingenuous lawyers, abuse of pretrial processes to incur delay, impatient
litigants and a failing faith m the judicial system. 2 Concerns about the
t © Copyright 1991 by Thomas A. Tozer.
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law; A.M., 1985, Umversity of
Chicago; A.B., 1982, Umversity of Chicago.
1. Advocates of judicial management have suggested many methods of judicial intervention
to speed the movement of cases through the court system. See generally Costantino, Judges
as Case Managers, 17 TaiAL 56 (Mar. 1981) (affalyzing the case load and case management of
one federal district judge); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) [hereinafter Lambros, The SJT and Others]
(discussing the advantages of summary jury trials (SJTs) as an alternative to full trial for
parties who prefer a jury to settlement negotiations); Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury
Trial, 29 Civ. ST. L. Rv. 43 (1980) (further discussing the pros and cons of SJTs); Peckham,
A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery
Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RuTGERs L. R-v. 253, 253 n.3, 264-80 (1985)
(defimng case management as two stages: planning pretrial matters and then the trial itself,
and summarizing arbitration, mnitrial, summary jury trial and mediation techniques); Peck-
ham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALrF. L. Rav. 770, 771, 805 (1981) [hereinafter Peckham, The New Role]
(applauding the use of pretrial devices such as early intervention to shape discovery, schedule
pretrial matters, define contested issues and calling for diligence in enforcing pretrial orders);
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L.
Ray. 703, 721-23 (1989) (proposing overhaul of discovery to require disclosure by parties rather
than current system of interrogatories and requests).
On the specific topic addressed in this Note, see Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some
Considerations for the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599 (1989); Note, Rule 16 and Pretrial
Conferences: Have We Forgotten the Most Important Ingredient?, 63 S. CAL. L. Rae. 1449
(1990) [hereinafter Note, Rule 16] (arguing for amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 to allow court orders compelling represented litigants to attend pretrial conferences);
Casenote, So It's Settled, Then-Rule 16 and Courts' Power to Order Represented Parties to
Attend Pretrial Settlement Conferences: G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989), 58 U. C. L. Rav. 1421 (1990) [hereinafter Casenote, So It's Settled]
(arguing that statutory construction rules reqtire disallowing the power under Rule 16 to order
represented parties to attend pretrial conferences).
2. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting) (observing thht many magistrates and judges distrust lawyers
to recommend settlement to a client in lieu of trial); Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47
(E.D. Ky. 1987) (citing case load of 400 per judge and the need to settle "at least 350"); see
also C. HARRINGTON, SHADow JusTIcE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTER-
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efficiency of justice are laudable, and where real problems exist they should
be addressed. Yet, the search for good case management methods should
not be guided by unsubstantiated claims of a method's efficiency
Some observers believe that the concerns of the judicial management
movement are exaggerated.' There also is evidence that some reforms the
movement has promoted are ineffective at speeding a litigant's case through
the courts. 4 Furthermore, the purported efficiency of a settlement-oriented
NATIVES TO COURT 15-21 (1985) (citing the growth of alternative dispute resolution as a
symptom of a political shift toward expanding judicial power); F LACEY, THE JuDca's ROi
IN THE SETTLEMENT OF Civ SuITs 16 (Federal Judicial Center 1977) (stating to newly appointed
judges that due to rising case loads "you have to settle an increasing percentage of your cases
just to stay even"); R. PosNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 65, 80 (1985)
(increased federal litigation is unmanageable); T. WnI.GINo, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT:
PRET IAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES (Federal Judicial Center 1985) (addressing docket manage-
ment problems specific to asbestos litigation); Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 519-21 (1984) (arguing that some judicial management
and involvement is necessary, and in fact is demanded, by the bar); Fox, Settlement: Helping
Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129, 130 (1971) (quoting Chief Justice
Burger's statement that efficient disposition of cases affects the credibility of the judicial
system); Lambros, The SJT and Others, supra note 1, at 465, 476-77 (suggesting that creative
use of alternative dispute resolution techniques is needed to preserve judicial resources for
processing "lugh impact," "trial-bound" cases); Note, Compelling.Alternatives: The Authority
of Federal Judges to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57 FoDiT L. REV. 483, 499-
500 (1988) (asserting that the success of summary jury trials m aiding docket management
argues for a rule allowing judges to compel participation in them).
Judges have responded to the perception of a crisis. See, e.g., Alschuler, Mediation with a
Mugger: The Need for a Two-Tier System of Adjudication, 99 HARv L. REv. 1808, 1829
(1986) (citing survey results indicating that most judges describe their intervention techniques
as aggressive, using "direct pressure").
3. See generally Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REV 366 (1986) (arguing
that there is too little data to justify many of the procedural changes backed by judicial
management proponents); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
Cm. L. REv 494, 511-12, 557-60 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith] (statistical data
comparing the frequency of trial adjudication to settlement ignores the substantial volume of
non-tnal adjudication); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAv L. REv 374, 417-24 (1982)
(purported efficiency gains at the district court level due to case management are largely
illusory); Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV 1901, 1907-08 (1989) ("Concern over excess
litigation in the federal courts is also typically exaggeration.").
4. See S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1977). The Flanders study shows
a rough inverse relationship between settlement involvement and terminations.
Only a positive relationship would support the idea that routine settlement
conferences are effective This outcome is striking, given the widespread
notion that a strong judicial role in settlement is necessary-even if possibly risky
or occasionally questionable-to handle a large and growing case load.
Id. at 37 (emphasis added); M. ROSENmERO, Tm PRETRIAL CoNFERENCE AND EFCcTVE JUSTICE
28-29 (1964); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 3, at 557-60; Rosenberg, Devising Procedures
that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REv 797, 804-08 (1971); see
also FED. R. Crv P 16 advisory committee's notes, introduction (citing Flanders study).
Methods which increase pretrial officials' power to effect settlement are questionable in
terms of both efficiency and propriety. Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses
[Vol. 66:977
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technique should not blind reformers to the fact that when such techniques
succeed they bring about resolutions that are unappealable, regardless of
whether the judge has understood the facts or the law involved.5 Tools that
provide only dubious gains in efficiency can produce real losses in the
quality of justice.6 Speedy injustice is not an improvement over slow justice.7
One answer to this objection is that when a pretrial official misconstrues
facts or law, the party who disagrees with the official should refuse to
settle. But this is too simplistic. What a litigant terms "disagreement" a
judge may call "delay." The real issue is how much power pretrial officials
should have over a litigant who refuses to settle.
A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit highlights this issue. In G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.8 (Heileman III), the court,
sitting en banc, chose to promote the power of federal pretrial officials 9 to
manage their case loads through pretrial settlement conferences over the
right of a litigant to demand a tnal.i° Heileman III interpreted Federal Rule
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Ra. 485, 497 (1985)
("Efficiency and reduction of delay do not necessarily increase with judicial settlement
management. Indeed the available data seem to suggest the opposite.").
5. See infra notes 54, 63 and accompanying text.
6. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 506-13. Menkel-Meadow argues that use of pretnal
conferences as a docket-cleanng device is "problematic in terms of the substantive and process
values (i.e., quality of solution) previously discussed." Id. at 508 (emphasis in original); see
also Rosenberg, supra note 4 at 804-08 (arguing that pretrial conferences neither save time nor
promote the quality of justice).
7. C. CLARK, PROCEDuRE-THE HANDMAID OF JUTIscE 166 (C. Wright & H. Reasoner
eds. 1965) ("[W]e must expect some delays in the operation of the democratic process, and
we must yield to dictatorships the palm for direct and speedy action ").
8. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) [hereinafter Heileman III], rev'g G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Heileman II].
Heileman / in turn reversed G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275
(W.D. Wis. 1985) [hereinafter Heileman 1].
9. Because either a judge or a magistrate may be involved in pretrial practice, this Note
will refer generally to such officials as "pretrial officials." See 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(i)(A)
(West Supp. 1990) (allowing district courts to delegate to magistrates authority over most
pretrial functions).
10. Proposed changes to Rule 16(a) do not address the problem at issue in Heileman III.
See FED. R. APP. P & FED. R. Crv. P (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, Sept.
1989).
The Sixth Circuit, in In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974), decided an issue similar
to that in Heileman, although the cases are distinguishable. In LaMarre, settlement was reached
before trial but the defendant's insurer's claims manager refused to accept it. Id. at 755. The
responsible claims manager, who was an unrepresented party and therefore reachable within
the letter of Rule 16(a) (see mfra note 12 for text of Rule 16(a)), was ordered to appear and
refused. LaMarre, 494 F.2d at 755. Sanctions were issued against the claims manager. Id.
Also, in Lockhart, 115 F.R.D. 44, a Kentucky district court judge, relying on the district
court decision in Heileman I, sanctioned an insurer for failure to send a responsible represen-
tative to a settlement conference. Id. at 46-47. In Lockhart the defendant lost a summary jury
trial for $200,000 and refused plaintiff's settlement offer of $175,000. Id. at 45. One notable
difference in Heileman is that Oat Corporation later complied with a request to take part in
a summary jury trial, and won. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Joseph Oat Corp. at 7, Heileman
II, 848 F.2d 1415 (No. 86-3118) [hereinafter Heileman I Brief].
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of Civil Procedure 16(a) to allow a pretrial magistrate to compel a repre-
sented litigant to attend pretrial conferences with "full authority to settle,"
even when the litigant is a defendant and has consistently refused to settle."
The decision also upheld monetary sanctions under Rule 16(f)12 against the
11. Heileman 111, 871 F.2d at 655. The underlying assumption of judicial management is
that use of the courts is a privilege which imposes obligations. See C. HARRN OToN, supra
note 2, at 15-23, 45-81 & 169-73 (discussing an ideologically based shift from the view that
access to the courts is a right to the view that access is a pnvilege imposing duties on users).
Even if one adopts this view, it can only apply to a plaintiff. A defendant should not be
obliged to the court simply because he has been dragged in by a plaintiff.
See also Heileman I, 107 F.R.D. 275, where the district court, effectively adopting this
assumption, stated:
By bringing their dispute to a court for resolution, the parties have invoked
the use of an expensive public resource. It is a misuse of those resources for any
party to refuse even to meet personally with the opposing party or its counsel to
attempt to resolve their disputes prior to trial.
Id. at 277. Harrington's "shift" may have untold consequences for public perception of, and
participation in, the court system. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1815 ("In the absence of
an effective peaceful means of vindicating private rights, people retain a plausible claim that
they are entitled to vindicate these rights through self-help."). The fact that Alschuler's topic
is criminal cases does not nummize the point.
It should be noted here that Oat Corporation was not a "pure defendant," but originally
was the plaintiff. It became the defendant after dropping its complaint. At that point only
the counterclaim of one of the original defendants remained. Heileman IX, 871 F.2d at 654
n.9.
12. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 656. The pertinent sections of the Rule read as follows:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its
discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation, and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute;
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference before
trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions
regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be
discussed.
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling
or pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared
[Vol. 66:977
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defendant for failing to comply with such an order. Notably, the Heileman
IfI court did not define what is required of a corporate litigant's "author-
ized" representative. In effect for the future, and in fact for the Heileman
III defendant, the decision leaves intact a questionable definition of that
term from the lower court."
Several issues surround the question of pretrial, settlement-oriented case
management and the "new power"' 14 approved in Heileman III. Tlus Note
explores these issues by examnimng three levels of the problem presented by
this newly approved power. These levels are: (1) what the goals of civil
procedure should be and whether the pretrial official's new power is likely
to help courts meet those goals, (2) whether the goals of the judicial
management movement, as embodied in the new pretrial power, can be
reconciled with the Anglo-American tradition of written law and the practical
separation of the judicial from the legislative function and, (3) whether
arguments based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rules") fall
decisively for or against the new power.
The Note concludes that the new power undermines the goals of civil
procedure, oversteps traditional boundaries on the judicial role and is not
conclusively supported by the Rules. Other means available to pretrial
officials are adequate, 15 if courts would make use of them, 6 to handle the
problems the judicial management movement correctly seeks to eliminate.
to participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate
in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make
such orders with regard thereto as are just
FED. R. Crv. P 16 (emphasis added). The reference to "authority" in subdivision (c)(1l) "is
not intended to insist upon the ability to settle the litigation." FED. R. Civ P 16 advisory
committee's notes, subdivision (c) (1983 amendment). Also, the purpose of pretrial orders "is
to guide the course of the litigation," and not to compel settlement. Id. at subdivision (e).
13. Consider the definition implied by the magistrate's opinion, affirmed and appended to
the district court's ruling: "While Mr. Fitzpatrick claimed authority to speak for Oat, he
stated that his authority was to make no offer [of cash]. Thus, no representative of Oat or
National [Oat's insurer] having authority to settle the case was present at the conference as
the order directed." Heileman I, 107 F.R.D. at 279 (emphasis added). The clear implication
is that "authority to settle" means the power to write a check.
14. It may be that the power is not new but merely has not been challenged. See Fox,
supra note 2, at 146, 154 (stating in 1971 that "it is often useful and sometimes imperative,
to have the parties themselves attend discussions," and that if a lawyer lacked authority to
settle, a judge could compel the client to attend a pretrial conference); In re LaMarre, 494
F.2d at 753, 756 (insurance claims manager who disobeyed order to attend conference was
sanctioned). The lack of cases challenging such orders reveals the coercive aspect of judicial
orders involving pretrial settlement negotiations.
15. See infra notes 34, 50-53 and accompanying text.
16. See generally Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial
Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 462-69 (1990) (suggesting more active judicial oversight of
attorneys to prevent abuse and delay). Courts already have the power to set mandatory
schedules to control discovery and set trial dates, to punish abusive practices and to call
pretrial conferences. See Fan. R. Civ. P 16(a), (b) & (f).
1991]
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I. TIm PROPER GoALs OF PROCEDURE AND TH Ia RELATION TO
THE NEW POWER
A. The New Power that Heileman III Approved
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v Joseph Oat Corp.17 arose out of a dispute
over Joseph Oat Corporation's ("Oat Corporation") role in the construction
of a waste water treatment plant for G. Heileman Brewing Company. Oat
Corporation's attorney and an attorney for its insurer attended a pretnal
conference on December 14, 1984. However, they were excluded from the
conference because they were unwilling to settle.' 8 At that conference the
magistrate entered an order for a continued conference and ordered Oat
Corporation's attorney and a representative from the company to appear
with authority to settle at a December 19 conference.19 Oat Corporation's
attorney later inquired by telephone whether someone from Oat Corporation
was required to attend even though the corporation would not settle for
money. The clerk told Oat Corporation's attorney that "[t]he magistrate
stands by his order." 2 Oat Corporation sent two attorneys to the conference.
Its lawyers had "authority to settle," provided they were not to pay money.21
The magistrate, "apparently miffed,"2 took this as less than "full authority
to settle" and ordered Oat Corporation to show cause why it should not
be sanctioned for failing to comply with the order that initiated the con-
ference. 23 The magistrate later ordered Oat Corporation to pay the plaintiff's
costs in attending the December 19 conference.2 The magistrate's order and
sanctions were affirmed by the district court.21 Oat Corporation appealed
this order to a panel in the Seventh Circuit, where it prevailed on the theory
that the magistrate has no power to order represented litigants to attend a
settlement conference under Rule 16.2 The panel decision was vacated and
reversed.27
17. Heileman III, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The facts also are discussed in
Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 650; Heileman II, 848 F.2d 1415, 1417 (7th Cir. 1988); and Heileman
, 107 F.R.D. 275, 278 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
18. Heileman II Brief, supra note 10, at 7
19. Id. at 4.
20. Heileman II, 848 F.2d at 1418. The written order did not reach the offices of Oat
Corporation's attorneys until the day of the pretnal conference, when the attorneys were
already m the magistrate's chambers. In fact, the order was not reduced to writing until the
day before the conference. Id.
21. Heileman II Brief, supra note 10, at 5.
22. Heileman II, 848 F.2d at 1417.
23. Id. at 1418.
24. Id.
25. Heileman 1, 107 F.R.D. 275.
26. Heileman II, 848 F.2d at 1422.
27. Heileman III, 871 F.2d 648.
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B. What Civil Procedure Should Do
A system of civil procedure should enable a court to uncover the truth
of the parties' claims in an even-handed, efficient and speedy manner, to
give all parties what is rightfully theirs as those rights are defined by the
law and to leave the parties with a sense that their rights have been fairly
addressed.2 Of course, a prescription for good civil procedure is easier to
write than it is to put into practice. Many of the goals listed above conflict
with each other. Providing a full-blown trial with appellate review to the
highest appropriate level in all cases would assure that every litigant's claim
was fully adjudicated and reviewed under the latest and most objective view
28. Federal Rule I states all of the "first-tier" purposes of procedure: speed, accuracy,
and procedural and substantive fairness. "Second-tier" concerns are also important. Such
concerns include party perception of fairness, limiting the number of tactical maneuvers
available to lawyers and reducing the queue at the bar of justice. The "tiers" are not meant
to connote any greater or lesser importance of the separate concerns. See Shreve, Questioning
Intervention of Right-Toward a New Methodology of Dectsionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. Rnv.
894, 907 (1980) (footnote omitted) ("A good procedure should be designed to be equally
accessible to all litigants, expeditious, and capable of presenting a sufficiently unobstructed
view of the rights of the parties so that the court can decide fairly the merits of the case.");
P CAmuHToN & B. BABCOCK, Ci. PRoCEDURE 1-2 (2d ed. 1977):
Contemporary civil procedure m the United States seeks moral acceptance m
two principal ways. One is to provide citizens with the opportunity to participate
on even terms in decisions which may negatively affect them: the adversary
tradition. The second is to assure citizens that [such] decisions . are not made
by the whim of officials, but by application of generally accepted principles
applied impersonally: heralded as the Rule of Law.
Id. at 1.
The linkage between the ideas derives thus: the application of law depends on
our knowing the truth about the circumstances to which the law is to be
applied
If we are to be effective in the enforcement of substantive law, we cannot
be too fastidious about costly adversary procedures
Id. at 2; F J+i.s & G. HAZARD, Crvn PRoicEDuRE 2-3 (2d ed. 1977):
mhe law of procedure is a model . [involving among other elements]
resolution according to principles applicable regardless of the identity of the
specific disputants (rules of law). These elements . express social and political
values concurrent with the policies expressed in substantive legal rules and deemed
worth fulfilling independently of what the substantive law may be.
. [P]rocedure should give all the parties to a dispute the feeling that they
are being farily [sic] dealt with, that each is given a reasonable chance to present
his side before a reasonably convenient tribunal.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
Not infrequently, however, the courts seek to accomplish substantial justice by
adhering to established substantive law but manipulating procedural rules in favor
of the "right" party. This causes some of the worst procedural rulings, which
may bring some kind of substantive justice in the case at hand but which produce
language and reasomng to vex other cases where an application of them may
thwart both procedural efficiency and also substantive justice, as measured by
any test.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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of the substantive law Yet, few litigants would want to take part in such
an elaborate and long-winded system, and even fewer would want to pay
for it. Furthermore, such a system would back up so quickly that it could
only be salvaged by a massive influx of judges at every level or by a massive
"outflux" of litigants. Perfect law, frictionless efficiency and lightning
speed may be impossible to put into practice, and given the costs of creating
such a system, perhaps undesirable. Still, under a "government of laws"
ideology, cases where facts are in dispute should always be exposed at trial
to the substantive law If the facts are not disputed, a judge should rule
on the applicable law. At a minmum, then, the ideal resolution of a dispute
entails a written opinion explaining the legal result, except in cases of truly
voluntary settlements, or a bench or jury trial resolving a factual dispute
in a well-settled area of the law. 29
C. Relation to the New Power
The new power ratified by the Heileman III court sacrifices concern for
the litigants' subjective view of the justice they receive to obtain a ques-
tionable increase in efficiency It is an unnecessary and potentially destructive
addition to the judge's pretrial tool chest.3 0 It is not demonstrably more
efficient than other pretrial techniques. It is not even-handed and therefore
probably harms the integrity of the justice system m the mind of the litigants
and the public. It does nothing to aid the court in getting to the truth of
the parties' claims. And it circumvents application of the law to the parties'
claims. The power to order a represented litigant to attend settlement
conferences, and to sanction her for failing to attend or to send an agent
who is "authorized to settle," is troublesome; it also may not be as efficient
as its proponents suggest nor as conducive to "judicial integrity" as they
would like. 31 Because the main concern of settlement-minded judges appears
to be efficiency,32 the threshold question is whether the new power is in
fact efficient.
29. See infra notes 47-54, 60-62 and accompanying text.
30. Oddly, the Seventh Circuit has forbidden judges from ordering litigants to take part
in summary jury trials. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). This is
cognitively dissonant with Heileman .111: The Seventh Circuit has given pretrial officials the
power to compel litigants to take part in a settlement-onented method (conferences) that
circumvents trial by an objective outsider, yet has denied them power to compel participation
in a settlement-onented method that may aid parties in reaching a consensus on disputed facts.
Summary jury findings are not binding and do not affect a party's right to a full trial, but
may help litigants assess how they would fare with a jury. See Lambros, The SJT and Others,
supra note 1, at 469.
31. See infra note 45 and text .accompanying notes 77-81.
32. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 651; see also F LACEY, supra note 2, at 25-26; Fox, supra
note 2, at 130; Lambros, The SJT and Others, supra note 1, at 476.
[Vol. 66:977
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A Federal Judicial Center study from the late 1970s found that settlement-
oriented techmques are not strongly conducive to docket efficiency.33 Fur-
thermore, the judges interviewed and the data collected suggested that the
most efficient methods are those that focus on readying a case for trial,
such as stringent dates for discovery and firm trial dates. 34 Such methods
also were viewed as the most effective in obtaining settlement.3 5
On one hand, even if one believes that judicial efficiency is of primary
importance, the practical benefits of a power to compel represented litigants
to'attend pretrial settlement conferences may be relatively small in those
terms. On the other hand, the lack of such a power may have little effect
on a pretrial official's ability to bring in a litigant by request. Apparently,
many represented litigants regularly comply with requests to attend settle-
ment conferences. 36 An order to compel attendance is unnecessary in many
cases because most litigants will attend a conference if requested to do so.
But when an order must be used, it is unlikely to yield a settlement (short
of judicial arm-twisting, which the Seventh Circuit assures us is out-of-
bounds)3 7 because litigants who would resist a request are likely to be the
most resistant to settlement as well. The new power, therefore, offers no
demonstrable added efficiency.
Nor is it so obvious whose interests are served by the Heileman III power.
It has been touted as serving the interests of litigants whose lawyers deal
with them less than honestly." Judges and rulemakers may be justifiably
wary of lawyers' motives and the tactics they can use to delay an opponent
33. S. FANrDRs, supra note 4, at 37. While "a nudge early in the case may break the
ice," id. at 39, time spent pushing parties toward settlement has little impact on case disposition
and "data suggest that a large expenditure of judicial time is fruitless." Id. at 37.
34. Id. at 17, 25, 33. Data showed that docket efficiency increased most dramatically
through judicial control over pretrial process timing and rapid progress toward trial. Id.
35. Id. at 37.
36. Heileman II, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is a rare attorney who
will invite a district judge's displeasure by defying a request to produce the client for a pretrial
conference."); see also Fox, supra note 2, at 146 (stating the usefulness of getting the actual
parties into the conference).
37. Heileman II, 871 F.2d at 653; see also Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that a judge may not order a litigant either to make or accept a settlement offer);
Del Rio v. Northern Blower Co., 574 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1978) (Reversing a district court's
order that a party who refused to reduce his claim in order to facilitate settlement pay the
entire cost of the suit because "[tihere is no duty to settle cases Unless his claim
is frivolous, a party is entitled to assert it, and to whatever judicial time is required to try
it.").
38. Richey, supra note 1, at 604 (arguing that the Heileman III decision was "wholly
proper" because "courts cannot always rely on attorneys to fairly relay to their clients the
merits of a particular settlement"); Note, Rule 16, supra note 1, at 1468, 1453 (arguing that
Rule 16 should be amended to allow the Heileman III power to comport with "the thematic
backdrop of the 1983 amendments" to the Federal Rules to avoid codifying "a dated conception
of the attorney-client relationship that is difficult to square with the growing control of
managerial judges over pretrial proceedings").
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and forestall trial or settlement. 9 And sometimes the careful application of
available pretrial powers may be needed to undermine techniques of delay. 0
But judges and rulemakers also should be wary of the powers they provide
pretrial officials, and the motives those officials may have for pushing
settlement on resolute litigants; motives such as political and peer pressure,
and even simple human exhaustion, which have no relationship to the merits
of a party's case. 41 In other words, while it may be "a fact of life that
settlements which may be in the client's best interest are not always in the
best interest of the client's lawyer in terms of fees," 42 it also is a fact that
pretrial officials have their own interests to serve. Those interests also can
conflict with the interests of a litigant who is determined to go to trial. If
there is reason to be wary of lawyers, then there is no reason to trust one
just because she is wearing a robe.43
If the Heileman III power does encourage litigants to settle, it may do
so only by undermimng their confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
system. A party who is open to settling a case will show up for a settlement
conference if requested to do so, or simply allow her lawyer the authority
reqmred.4 But a represented party who has refused to settle may feel she
is being harassed by an order to attend and doubt the court's ability to
give her a fair trial. Producing this doubt in a litigant's mind may increase
her desire to settle; she may believe that she can exert some control over
39. See, e.g., Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting); Elliott, Managerial
Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 306, 316 (1986).
40. See generally Note, supra note 16 (calling for use of district courts' inherent powers
to prevent attorneys from delaying trial).
41. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (Part 1), 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1059, 1099-1102 (1976) (describing the politics, gamesmanship and egotism involved in "dis-
position rate rivalry" and "the motives of bargaining trial judges"). Though it deals with
crnunal courts, Alschuler's underlying assumption that "the primary reason for the activism
of most judges is the need to process large caseloads with seriously inadequate resources" is
as true for civil cases. Id. at 1099; see also Note, Limits of Judicial Authority in Pretrial
Settlement Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 Omo J. ON DIsPTm
REsoLUroN 311, 321 (1987) (discussing the "deleterious effect" participation in such confer-
ences may have on a judge); Bills Aim to Curb Litigation Delay: Package in State Senate
Looks to Cure Motion Practice Abuse, Delay by Judges, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1988, at 1, col.
3; Colorado Judge Sanctioned for Delay: 2 Years to Rule on "Common" Case, Nat'l L.J.,
Dec. 22, 1986, at 3, col. 1; High Court Censures Judge for Delaying Cases, L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 6, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
42. Richey, supra note 1, at 604.
43. Although "a basic and necessary assumption of our system [is] that judges can be
trusted," Note, Rule 16, supra note 1, at 1449, they need not be trusted unconditionally.
Lawyers also must be trusted for the system to work-especially when we remember that
litigants choose their lawyers, but not their judges. Most observers grow wary of a lawyer at
the point where her interests conflict with her client's. Id. at 1480-81. So, too, at that point
the system should be wary of pretrial officials. See also S. FL.NDEs, supra note 4, at 40
(citing some lawyers' belief that judges may use pretrial devices to force "busy work" on
lawyers and expense on their clients to coerce settlement and avoid the merits).
44. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also Casenote, So It's
Settled, supra note 1, at 1443-44.
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settlement but that she is powerless to control the judge's whims. If this is
how the new power works to produce settlements, then it must severely
undercut the "integrity of the court" as measured by public confidence in
the system. 45
The power to compel represented litigants to appear at settlement con-
ferences also conflicts with civil procedure's truth-finding function. Settle-
ment conferences take time and money, resources that could be spent on
discovery. Through discovery the parties and their lawyers learn about each
others' case. Discovery may also enable the parties to reach a consensus
about the truth, and about their respective rights."6 Relying on judicial
pressure toward, settlement to terminate cases shortchanges the discovery
process.
Cases settle for several reasons besides judicial intervention. Nonetheless,
whatever a party's reasons for settling, fear of judicial harassment and
sanction for failure to settle should not be among them. Pretrial officials
already have extensive powers they may use to make settlement attractive
to otherwise reluctant parties. Rule 16 should not be read nor amended to
expand these powers.
II. THE TRADmON
The new power sidesteps traditional notions about the role of the judiciary
in a democratic legal system. The empowering conception of courts as an
instrument of the sovereign, and the limiting conception of courts as a part
45. When courts discuss "judicial integrity," they commonly include concern for public
perception of the system and the appearance of impropnety. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (fearing the majority
holding would undermine "the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court"). In Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court, observing the importance of judicial integrity, en route
to extending the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states, said:
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. As Mr.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States: "Our goverrinent
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill it teaches the whole
people by its example."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citation omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960)); see also Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) ("fraudulently
begotten judgments" tamper with the "administration of justice"), overruled in Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 425
(9th Cir. 1989) (setting aside a judgment obtained by a co-defendant's counsel who was not a
licensed attorney would not "protect [the] integrity of the judicial system" from this type of
misconduct in the future); United States v. Stout, 723 F Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing a
concern for public perception and judicial integrity in holding to remove an attorney from
defending in a criminal case for conflict of interest); In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38
(1961) (citing the need for the public to be protected from the professional misconduct of
attorneys).
46. See F LACEY, supra note 2, at 14 (also noting that the lawyers' experience plays a
crucial role); Fox, supra note 2, at 136.
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of a system of written laws are both endangered when judges can "make
law" surreptitiously. 47 The initiation and progress of settlement discussions
should be treated delicately, not with the blunt instrument provided by the
Heileman III court. A good settlement saves resources for the parties and
for society But a settlement involving even a whiff of coercion threatens
fundamental principles of the traditional justice system.
A. The Historical Foundations of Judicial Power
1. The Role of the Courts
The American judicial system developed within a tradition that views
courts as an instrument of the sovereign lawmaking power.4 1 Judicial inter-
vention that disposes of a case without exanmimng the facts and issues under
substantive law, and without requiring the judge to report reasons for her
decision, threatens the practical separation of powers49 in this system. A
tool that increases a court's power to coerce a pretrial settlement from an
unwilling party increases to an unacceptable level the likelihood of judicial
lawmaking beyond its legitimate scope.
47. When parties take a dispute to the courts for adjudication under substantive law, its
resolution is law for them: it governs the outcome and dictates their rights. Therefore, whether
a dispute takes parties to trial or is resolved before trial by settlement, effectively the result
is law. A pretrial official who coerces such an outcome surreptitiously "makes law" for those
parties and leaves nothing written to guide later courts and litigants or to appeal to higher
courts.
48. Before 1066, English courts were decentralized both in form and m the substance of
the law. Local courts made local law, and the system was a freewheeling one, where courts
sold their services and offered varying remedies for a price. After 1066, the Norman kings
sought to consolidate the courts to maximize control over the lawmaking power. See, e.g., P
CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, supra note 28, at 4-16 (stating that the English common law was
a product of the Norman Conquest of 1066); M. HAL, Tma HISTORY OF COMMON LAW
ENGLAND 16-27 (C. Gray ed. 1971); F MAITAND, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 26-
73, 131-59 (1915). Centralization of courts and the system of writs began as a means of
strengthemng the crown's control. Resistance occurred (for instance, in the events leading to
the Magna Carta), but by the end of the thirteenth century the royal power, subject to the
growing influence of Parliament, prevailed and the control of justice centralized. The American
colomes established legal institutions which largely replicated those to be found in England in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. F JAMsS & G. HAZARD, supra note 28, at 8-9.
As one influential drafter of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure noted, the
American court system evolved based on this model: control over the lawmaking power by
the sovereign. C. CLARK, supra note 7, at 160. By the time the American system took root,
in England and in the colomes the sovereign lawmaking power rested in the legislature, and
through that vehicle, in the people.
To an American understanding the people are sovereign. See U.S. CONST. preamble ("We
the people ordain and establish this Constitution "). Therefore, the conception of
the courts as a tool for application of sovereign-made law is a democratic one under such a
system.
49. The question of constitutional separation of powers is beyond the scope of this Note.
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Unlike summary judgment, 0 declaratory judgment, 51 judgment on the
pleadings5 2 Rule 12(b) dismissal and other pretrial, party or judge-initiated
methods of moving cases toward a final disposition, 3 an off-record settle-
ment conference generates no records or written opimons on the facts or
the law involved, and the means used to bring the conference about are
unappealable,5 4 emphatically so if it results in a strong-armed settlement.
Such a result conflicts with the American conception of the judicial system
as a fact-finding mechanism that submits disputes to written, substantive
law.
2. The Role of the Process
The modem judicial management movement is motivated by a concern
for the integrity of the legal system as well as for its efficiency. It is a
reaction to problems generated by the current system of pleading, and is
related to prior movements to revamp the processes of justice. For instance,
the common law pleading system presented numerous problems of fairness
for both the litigants and the court.5 5 The complexity of the system led to
the dismissal of worthy actions for failure to make the proper tactical move.
Pure lawyering skills often carried more weight than did the merits of a
plaintiff's action. And the system's insistence on narrowing issues to a lone
"crucial" controversy often left important questions unconsidered and pro-
duced artificial results. 56
50. See FaD. R. Civ. P 56.
51. See FED. R. Cir. P 57.
52. See FED. R. Crv. P 12(c).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P 26, 36, 37 (discovery, requests for admission and sanctions for
failure to make or cooperate in discovery, respectively).
54. See infra note 63. Because the coerced party indicates "consent" to the settlement,
whatever her practical reason, she cannot complain later that it was reached without her
consent. The pressure used to gain tis "consent" is not subject to review, unless it amounts
to direct coercion. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (a judge may not coerce a
litigant either to make or to accept a settlement offer). In Kothe the court found coercion
where the tnal judge recommended a settlement amount and warned of sanctions if the parties
settled after tnal began for a comparable figure. Id. at 669.
Tis scenario makes negative assumptions about some pretrial officials. But at least some
wanness is justified. Advocates of judicial management repeatedly criticize lawyers for dubious
tactics. See, e.g., Note, supra note 16. The system should not assume that pretrial officials
are always above similar behavior. In fact, somewhat disturbing is the admission of one
management advocate that judges do in fact coerce settlements. See F LAcEY, supra note 2,
at 19. Speaking to newly appointed judges, Lacey cautioned that, "[i]n the long term, coerced
settlements will add to neither your stature as a judge nor your success at settling cases." Id.
If coercion were not a problem, he would not have had to address it. See also Elliott, supra
note 39, at 309 (emphasis in original) ("Managerial judges believe that the system does not
work; that something must be done to make it work; and that the only plausible solution to
the problem is ad hoc procedural activism by judges.").
55. See C. CLa&x, supra note 7, at 78-82.
56. Id. at 76-79. The Field Code was an initial attempt to remedy some of these problems.
However, for several reasons it failed. For an explanation of the Field Code's attempts and
failures, see id. at 79.
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Today's system under the Federal Rules presents new problems of its
own.57 For instance, the Rules require only that a plaintiff give "notice"
of her claim to the defendant. The emphasis on mere notice may leave a
court with the burdensome task of decoding an incoherent set of pleadings. 51
This should not be the court's task, at least not one it should have to
handle alone; and to be fair to a defendant the system ought eventually to
require something more of a plaintiff than "he done me wrong." The
Federal Rules, as they were originally written and as they have developed
since, attempt to meet this problem with post-filing, pretrial procedures to
clarify factual disputes and narrow legal issues. This creates a post-filing
"backwash." The judicial management movement is a response to such
problems and to that extent it is beneficial. Pretrial conferences aimed at
preparing a case for actual litigation and the use of several pretrial devices,
such as the power to set firm discovery deadlines and trial dates, have a
real impact on moving cases quickly through the process, in improving trial
quality and in bringing about settlement.5 9 These contributions should not
be overlooked.
However, to recognize the contributions and laudable motives of the
judicial management movement does not require ignoring traditional notions
about the justice system and procedure's role in it. Judicial efficiency
conflicts with the court's proper role as an instrument of the democratic
lawmaking process when it requires granting overly coercive powers to a
pretrial official.
B. Boundaries of the Judicial Role: Why the Limit Exists and
How the Seventh Circuit's New Power Oversteps that Line
Our judicial system is based on an admittedly idealized conception of the
legal system as one of written laws, rather than one based on the whims
57 See generally Elliott, supra note 39. Elliott believes that the judicial management
movement is "a response to a fundamental design flaw in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
the lack of incentives for litigants to narrow issues for trial." Id. at 308.
58. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV P 8(a).
The Rule is generally referred to as the notice pleading rule. For a classic example of the
extent to which trial courts may be driven to find a cause of action in a home-drawn complaint
under Rule 8, see DioGuardi v. Durmng, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
59. See S. FL . as, supra note 4, at 33-37; Fox, supra note 2, at 136 (noting that "the
ideal posture for trial is also the most favorable point to discuss settlement"); Peckham,
The New Role, supra note 1, at 773 ("An attorney who is compelled at an early date to
examine closely the strengths and weaknesses of his case is also more likely to negotiate an
early settlement."); Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 807 ("cases subjected to mandatory pretrial
conferences resulted in trials" of higher quality).
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of rulers. 60 As a part of this traditional ideal, judges who interpret the law
should at least report the reasons for their decisions in written opinons. 61
According to the traditional ideal, a judge should render a written
decision, one that lets the parties know where they stand and one which
they can appeal. The tradition of "a government of written laws" places a
judge within certain boundaries: The logic of her written decision can be
followed and analyzed and its reasoning made plain to the losing party;
and if her decision conflicts with clear precedent or ignores a statute, that
result may be appealed. 62
A settlement achieved through harassment or intimidation of a party has
neither of these virtues. The reasong of the decisionmakers is not preserved
in writing as a part of the public record, and the result cannot be appealed.
Even if a coerced settlement results in the most just, economical and speedy
disposition ever achieved in the history of jurisprudence, it would still be
lacking. Such an impressive feat should be preserved in writing to aid future
courts. However, if judicial harassment results in a less-than-optimal dis-
position, the coerced party is left with no recourse to protest her treatment
and may feel cheated by the system she had looked to for justice.63
60. The original draft of the Massachusetts Constitution (1779), drafted by John Adams,
prormsed "[a] government of laws, and not of men." J. BARTLETT, FA .iAR QUOTATIONS 368
(13th ed. 1955). This language was echoed m Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
163 (1803) ("Mhe government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men."). See also E. Coawn, THE "HIGHER LAw" BACKoROUND Op
A~mucAN CoNsTrtmoNAI. LAW 8 (1955).
61. See, e.g., F. MAITAD, supra note 48, at 2, 110 n.1. Maitland describes a 700 year
history of written decisions in English courts. Reporters, though limited in number, began
circulating around 1292. Id. at 110 n.1. While the number of reporters grew in England, prior
to 1776 the colomal courts and the lawyers practicing in them did not keep reporters of
American decisions. Id. at 132 n.1; M. HALE, supra note 48, at 16. One reason for the sparsity
of reporters in the early colomes may be that, "[i]n some colomes, lawyers were distinctly
unwelcome," L. FRmDAN, A HISTORY OF Ammuc~A LAw 96 (2d ed. 1985), and hence, their
law books were also unwelcome.
62. In her idealized role, a judge applies law made by the legislature and fills gaps it has
not addressed. Yet, statutes by nature must be broadly drawn, and judges must deal with
specific actors in specific situations facing specific consequences. In this role, judges always
have made, and in fact must make, law.
Yet, even the traditional, idealized model does not require judicial deference to every
legislative pronouncement. When the legislature makes laws that tread upon fundamental rights
the judiciary ought to step in. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (When a law conflicts
with an individual right, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."); THE FEaERALIsT No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1904). But it
must do so in written opimons, both for the sake of the parties involved and for the benefit
of the minority which such a decision must protect:
[A] volumnous code of laws is one of the inconvemences necessarily connected
with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in
the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them
Id. at 490.
63. Pretrial tactics that result in settlement appear to be unappealable, except for direct
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The Seventh Circuit majority opinion mouthed the oft-repeated warning
that a federal court may not coerce a settlement. 4 But coercion is in the
eye of the beholder.65 There are tools available to the court to make
settlement attractive to a party or her lawyer without the magistrate or
judge having actually to order acceptance of a settlement offer. The new
power unnecessarily strengthens the court's hand in this regard. Under
Heileman III, a pretnal official may repeatedly" force a represented party
to travel long distances and spend additional time and money to attend
meetings which she is already paying her lawyer to attend. 67
The power to order a represented litigant to attend pretrial conferences
may have some utility and may already be widely used.6 However, its
coercion to settle. In re Ashcroft, 888 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1989) ("If the case were settled,
obviously the issue of the propriety of this action [the district court's alleged efforts to force
settlement], as well as the other issues in the case, would disappear."). Because a represented
party must obey an order, or even several orders, to attend settlement conferences, those
orders may subtly coerce a litigant into settling a case. Malone v. United States Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Chapman v. Pacific Tele., 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th
Cir. 1979)) (holding that counsel who 'believes a pretrial order is erroneous is not relieved
of the duty to obey it'), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988); see also United States v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (citations omitted) (noting that "an order
issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the
parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings").
64. Heileman III, 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); see also Del Rio v. Northern
Blower Co., 574 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1978) (a party has no duty to settle a case, but has the
right to assert a claim unless it is frivolous).
65. "Our trial judges must never fall prey to becoming part of a process that even
subliminally suggests a pressure to forego the essential right of trial." Heileman III, 871 F.2d
at 661 (Coffey, J., dissenting); see also Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,
466-67 (1952) ("[Tlhe adminstration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested
as well as be so in fact.").
66. The official comments to the 1983 amendments to Rule 16(b) state that as many pretrial
conferences as necessary may be scheduled. FED. R. Civ P 16(b) committee comment; see
also 3 J. MooRE & R. FREER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE 16.16.1 (2d ed. 1990).
67 Joseph Oat Corp., for instance, is located in Camden, New Jersey. The conferences
were held in the federal district court in Madison, Wisconsin. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 654.
68. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 2, at 146, 154. Writing in the early 1970s, Fox suggested
that judges were already requiring party attendance at pretrial conferences and that a judge
could, and often should, compel the client to attend a pretrial conference. See also In re
LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that a judge may compel a party's
presence at a pretrial conference); In re Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F Supp.
1433 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that courts have authority to order officers of a represented
corporation to attend pretrial conferences); Curto v. International Longshoremen's & Ware-
housemen's Union, 107 F Supp. 805, 808 (D. Or. 1952) (explaining a District of Oregon court
rule that litigants were required to attend pretrial conferences unless excused by the court
where those conferences were conducted in open court on a full record and were aimed at
simplifying issues for trial and convincing litigants of the fairness of the process), aff 'd, 226
F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956). On related issues, see Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (affirming
an order of a pretrial official compelling litigants to attend and take part in a non-binding
summary jury trial); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (upholding
an order to compel participation in a non-binding summary jury trial); Arabian Am. Oil Co.
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potential for harassing a.represented litigant is too great. Judges are not
immune to ambition and ego, and many have found themselves under great
pressure to move their cases.6 9 A judge's anger at a party who is unwilling
to bend to what seems a reasonable settlement offer is natural. The temp-
tation to order a recalcitrant party to appear for a tongue lashing, with the
threat of more such orders in the future, may seem like a reasonable way
to get the right thing done. However, the potential efficiency of the Heileman
III power masks the fact that it allows judges to "get the right thing done"
in a way that deprives litigants of the opportunity to review or to appeal a
written decision.
The coercive power created by Heileman III conflicts with the conception
of courts as a part of the democratic tradition of written laws. In this
instance, this Note suggests that courts and rulemakers defer to tradition.
III. Tm Ru. 16 IssuE
An examination of Rule 16 and the general policies underlying the Federal
Rules does not provide any conclusive argument either for or against the
new power. Although advocates and opponents of the new power both rely
on rules of statutory construction, these rules merely cancel each other out.
An argument that the Rules demand efficiency (which they do) ignores the
fact that they also require procedural fairness. Finally, the semantic wizardry
of a claim that "orders compelling attendance with authority to settle do
not compel settlement" rings hollow without a clear definition of the
authority required. Because the power does not clearly aid efficiency and
fairness and because rules of statutory construction fail to provide a clear
answer, the other concerns raised in this Note should tip the scales toward
withdrawing this power from the pretrial official.
A. The Formal Arguments
The primary arguments used by both the Heileman III majority and the
panel opimon it reversed were based on formalistic rules of construction.
The view that prevailed in the vacated panel decision was that if Rule 16
v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a judge may compel parties to
participate in summary trials). Contra Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.
1988) (reversing an order compelling participation in summary jury tnals (SJTs)). Because
SJTs are intended to encourage settlement, the decisions upholding compulsory attendance at
SJTs may be read to support orders compelling litigant attendance at settlement conferences.
However, SJTs occur just once, are held on the record and are non-binding; settlement
conferences may be called repeatedly, are held off the record, and their results, if successful,
are binding.
69. See Alschuler, supra note 41, at 1099-1102, and supra note 41 (citing news articles).
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does not mention the power, then the Rule does not allow it.70 Such a
construction, however, is no more persuasive than its opposite: that if Rule
16 does not mention the new power, then it does not forbid it. The latter
construction seems to be the crux of the en banc majority's holding, insofar
as it relies upon the view that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts."' 7' These
arguments from methods of construction are useless for evaluating the
legitimacy of the Heileman III power because the methods simply cancel
each other out.72
Yet, the Heileman I1 majority's approach to statutory construction may
pose an additional problem. In a dissenting opimon to Heileman III, Judge
Ripple questioned the right of the court-vis-A-vis Congress-to create
powers for itself based on the mere absence of a prohibition in the
promulgated Rules. Ripple pointed to the dangerous impact of the majority's
opinion "on the relationship between the Judiciary and the Congress in
establishing practice and procedure for the federal courts. The Rules
Enabling Act hardly contemplates the broad, amorphous, definition of the
'inherent power of a district judge' . articulated by the majority ,,71 In
other words, Ripple claimed that the statutory construction adopted by the
vacated panel decision is demanded by the constitutional relationship be-
tween Congress and the courts which Congress is empowered to create. If
this is the case, then the majority's construction of Rule 16 is not merely
unhelpful but also unconstitutional. 74
B. Arguments from the Policy of Efficiency
The Heileman III majority also relied on the general policy of the Federal
Rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
70. Heileman II, 871 F.2d 648, 667 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Mamion, J., dissenting)
(Manion stated that litigants have a right to conduct a case through counsel, relying on 28
U.S.C. § 1654); see also Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 658-60 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Rule 16's terms are unambiguous: only an unrepresented party and attorneys may be
ordered to appear and amendments have not added or implied anything to this power). Contra
Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 651 (majority suggesting Rule 16 requires that settlement "should
be pursued and discussed vigorously"). However, Rule 16 contains no language to the effect
that settlement "should be pursued and discussed vigorously," nor does it contain any
discussion of settlement at all. See supra note 12 (contaimng the pertinent text of Rule 16 and
the Committee comments).
71. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 651 (citing HMG Property Investors, Inc. v. Parque Indus.
Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 915 (1st Cir. 1988)).
72. But see Casenote, So It's Settled, supra note 1, at 1437-41 (arguing that the Heileman
III majority's decision conflicts with a proper application of the rules of statutory construction).
73. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
74. But see Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (commenting that district courts
have power to enact local rules necessary to manage their dockets); Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (holding that district courts have inherent discretion to
sanction abusive litigation strategies by dismissing sua sponte a plaintiff's complaint for failure
to prosecute). While Link may cut against Ripple's constitutional argument, its result adds
weight to the argument that the Heileman III power is unnecessary. However, resolution of
the issue Ripple raised is beyond the scope of this Note.
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action." 75 The power to compel represented litigants to attend pretrial
settlement conferences complies with this command, the majority wrote,
because it is "efficient ... [and] preserve[s] the integrity of the judicial
process ",76 and therefore complies with the command of Rule 1. But
the majority's argument fails on two grounds. First, there is at least a valid
question whether this power is efficient at all.Y Second, even assuming it
is efficient, whether it also promotes judicial "integrity" is still questionable.
The answer depends on what meaning is given the word "integrity "
By "integrity," the Heileman III majority may have meant merely that
the new power promotes the "sound, ummpaired, or perfect condition"78
of the judicial system. But if one measures the system's "condition" only
by the speed of case resolution, and not by the quality of justice it produces
(including the parties' assessment of its fairness), then conceivably any
efficient alternative would be acceptable.79 To read the Federal Rules this
way would remove all boundaries on the power of the court over litigants.
Giving the Heileman III majority the benefit of the doubt, it is fair to
assume that it had in mind more than turnover rates when it invoked the
term "integrity," and was equally concerned about quality of justice and
fairness to litigants. In that case, it is worth asking whose evaluation of
the system's "integrity" is more important: the view of judges, or, that of
the parties and the public? The goals of civil procedure put a premium on
the parties' views of judicial integrity.8 0 Likewise, cases which discuss
"judicial integrity" consider foremost the perception of the parties and the
general public.8'
The Heileman IfI majority did not address how the new power will affect
the views of a represented party who has been ordered to attend a pretrial
settlement conference. Instead, the majority's principle concern was ensuring
the power of the pretrial official to obtain obedience from the parties: the
decision lacked any concern for how the parties and the public perceive the
system's integrity. The Heileman III power places a premium on the pretrial
official's view of the case because it increases her ability to coerce settlement
from a resolute litigant with a contrary view of the matter, ensures that a
coerced settlement will not be appealed and ignores the litigant's subjective
belief that consent was unfairly coerced. This result is immical to the goals
of civil procedure.
75. FED. R. CIw. P i.
76. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 651.
77. See supra notes 4, 33-37 and accompanying text.
78. THE RANDoM HoUSE DIcIoNARY oF THE ENGuSH LANGUAGE 692 (college ed. 1968).
79. To bnng about a more efficient turnover rate, a court might order a wheel of fortune
installed inside the courtroom door for plaintiffs to spin, or decide to rule for defendants on
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
80. See supra notes 28 & 45 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 45.
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C. The Semantic Wizardry
The third argument the majority mustered was that an order compelling
a represented litigant to appear with full authority to settle is not the same
as an order to settle s2 To a litigant, this is a merely semantic distinction if
the required authority is not clearly defined.
According to the Heileman I majority, Oat Corporation's representative
was only ordered to appear "to consider the possibility of settlement"
should acceptable terms be proposed.83 This interpretation makes no sense
in light of the facts: Oat Corporation had already indicated that it was not
willing to pay any money at that time.14 From Oat Corporation's standpoint,
then, its attorneys did appear with "full authority" to approve any "ac-
ceptable" terms. Oat Corporation was sanctioned solely because the mag-
istrate did not agree with its view of what was "acceptable."
The court may have meant that Oat Corporation failed to comply with
the December 18 order because it failed to present a properly representative
corporate agent at the conference."5 However, "Itihe proposition that a
magistrate may require a firm to send an employee rather than a represen-
tative is rather puzzling." '8 6 In the case of an individual litigant the distinction
is fairly simple to make: the client is a person who either is at the conference
or is not. But a corporation itself cannot attend a settlement conference.
Someone employed by it-the president, the chairman of the board of
directors, maybe the entire board-must appear as its representative. But
corporations also often employ outside attorneys, and more to the point,
employ them specifically to represent the corporation in court proceedings.
If the majority meant that Oat Corporation violated the court order
because it failed to provide an agent with "full authority to settle" (the
precise term that Oat Corporation claimed not to uilderstand 1 ), then it is
odd that the majority failed to define the term. Although two Oat Corpo-
ration lawyers attended the December 19 meeting, this, the court reasoned,
was not enough because the corporation "was well aware of what the court
expected." 8 But even if the company did understand "what the court
expected," the fact that its executives had decided not to settle meant the
82. Heileman 11I, 871 F.2d at 653.
83. Id. (citing Heileman , 107 F.R.D. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Wis. 1985)).
84. Heileman 11, 848 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
85. Heileman I11, 871 F.2d at 656-57.
86. Id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
87 See Heileman II Brief, supra note I0. "Both Attorney Possi and Attorney Fitzpatrick
had full authority to settle the case on behalf of Oat, but not to pay any money. The
Magistrate, by inference, took the position that his order that the parties have 'authority to
settle' meant that they have authority to pay money." Id. at 5; see also FED. R. Civ P 16
advisory committee's note, 1983 amendment, subdivision (c) (reference in the Rule "is not
intended to insist upon the ability to settle the litigation").
88. Heileman 111, 871 F.2d at 655.
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magistrate would have had to compel at least a quorum of the board to
attend to get someone into the conference who could agree to pay money.89
The court's failure to define "authority to settle" creates a dissonance
between its insistence that Oat Corporation was not compelled to settle and
the pretrial magistrate's definition of the phrase9 ° This brings to nnd two
hypothetical problems. First, Oat Corporation's lawyers were excluded from
the December 14 conference because they refused to pay money.91 They
were then sanctioned for failing to have authority to settle when they
appeared at the December 19 conference.Y Supposing that Oat Corporation
had supplied its company president on December 19-but with an order
from the board not to pay cash-the circuit court's decision suggests that
Oat Corporation would have satisfied the magistrate's pretrial order. How-
ever, this may well not have satisfied the magistrate.93 Second, suppose Oat
Corporation's president had appeared with authority to settle the case for
$1.35, 94 and that was not "full authority," would $10 have been enough?
If neither offer satisfied the magistrate, it must be because the magistrate
had already decided what the case was worth-a decision that implies that
he had already decided the facts. Yet, if he had decided the facts, the
proper course was to recommend summary judgment95 rather than push the
parties toward a settlement.
This is why the court's parroting of the caveat that "courts should not
coerce settlements" is meanngless. A pretrial official need not "coerce" a
settlement through court order when the Heileman III Rule 16 power clearly
illustrates for the litigant the link between her checkbook and the threat of
pumshment. 6
CONCLUSION
The power ratified by Heileman III threatens the traditional role of
American courts as an instrument of sovereign lawmaking power. It does
89. Id. at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
90. See supra note 13 (containing the relevant part of the magistrate's opinion).
91. Heileman II, 848 F.2d at 1417.
92. Id. at 1418.
93. See supra note 13. The magistrate may have ordered the company's board of directors
to attend a third conference, an action now permitted under Heileman III.
94. Presumably this would have satisfied the magistrate's demand that authority to settle
include the power to make a cash offer. See supra note 13.
95. Under Rule 72(b), the magistrate would send proposed findings of fact to the distnct
court judge with a recommendation for summary judgment. The judge may accept, reject or
modify the recommended decision, recommit the findings for further hearings before the
magistrate, or receive further evidence herself. FED. R. Crv. P 72.
96. Judge Easterbrook also noted the potential for harassment latent in the new power.
This potential is exacerbated by the majority's failure to define "authority to settle," which
by default left the magistrate's definition intact: "The order we affirm today compels persons
who have committed no wrong, who pass every requirement of Rules 11 and 68, who want
only the opportunity to receive a decision on the merits, to come to court with open checkbooks
on pain of being held in contempt." Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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so by handing pretnal officials the power to circumvent the system of
written law while making law-m-fact, and by giving short shrift to concerns
about the public perception of judicial fairness. While these arguments favor
denying the power to pretrial officials, the arguments from statutory con-
struction do not cut clearly either way The Heileman I majority's con-
struction of the Rule, if not constitutionally problematic, is at least no
more persuasive than the equally formalistic argument relied on in the
decision it reversed.
The Seventh Circuit offers platitudes in response to important concerns
about coercing settlements, and leaves key terms undefined-terms that go
to the heart of a litigant's potential confusion about the scope of authority
she or her agent must bnng to a settlement conference to avoid sanctions.
With other techniques available to move cases and encourage settlement,
the usefulness of the Heileman III power is small. What utility it has is
outweighed by its dangers. Pnor to Heileman III, pretnal officials had at
their fingertips several tools to aid docket management. Those tools are still
available. Therefore, the power to order represented litigants to attend
pretnal conferences does little to further docket management. Its potential
efficiency does not warrant creating a potential source for judicial harass-
ment of represented litigants. Heileman III hands pretrial officials a blunt
instrument to hold over the heads of resolute litigants, rather than the kind
of well-honed tool that is needed to aid both of the parties in reaching a
voluntary settlement.
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